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Evidence illegally Seized by Private Persons
Excluded From Criminal ProsecutionPeople v. McComb*
Defendant's wife and a private detective rented units on either
side of defendant's motel room, placed an electronic listening device
bet1veen one of the units and defendant's room, and entered defendant's room with a key obtained by bribing the chambermaid.
Photographs were taken, and clothing and bedding were seized;
this evidence was delivered to the prosecutor, who brought a criminal
action for adultery. The Circuit Court for Calhoun County, Michigan, held that evidence obtained by private persons through an
entry and taking which are criminal under state law must be excluded from a subsequent criminal prosecution.1 Exclusion was
considered necessary, on non-constitutional grounds, to preserve -the
integrity of the law-enforcement process and to prevent collusive
agreements bet1veen the police and private persons.
At common law, illegally seized evidence was admissible on the
theory that the nature of the seizure did not necessarily affect the
probative value of the evidence.2 However, in 1914 the United
States Supreme Court, in order to protect the fourth amendment's
guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures,
adopted a rule excluding from federal courts evidence illegally seized
by federal officials.8 In 1961, the scope of this rule was extended by
Mapp v. Ohio, 4 which held that all evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment is inadmissible in state courts. However, the
Mapp doctrine applies only to "official lawlessness," 5 not to unlawful
private seizures. Since Burdeau v. McDowell, 6 in which the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution does not forbid the admission in
evidence in a criminal trial of papers illegally seized by private
persons, state and federal courts have refused to exclude evidence
in criminal prosecutions unless there was some official involvement
in the unlawful search and seizure.7 However, the Michigan Supreme
• Finding, Doc. No. 21-225, Calhoun County Cir. Ct. Mich., Feb. 24, 1965 (hereinafter cited as principal case).
1. The court found that there had been an illegal entry without permission, that
the taking of the key by .the chambermaid was larceny, and that removal of the evidence constituted larceny from a building under MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 750.115, .356,
.360 (1948).
2. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 Atl. 636 (1924); Commonwealth
v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert.
denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926). See generally McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 137 (1954); 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Id. at 655. (Emphasis added.)
6. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
7. E.g., United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); People v.
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Court has not been strictly insistent upon finding official involvement as a prerequisite for excluding evidence considered offensive.
In a 1958 civil wrongful death action, the court held that a blood
sample taken by a private nurse without the defendant's consent
was inadmissible because the "taking" violated the right to privacy
granted by a Michigan constitutional provision similar to the fourth
amendment.8 Although the fourth amendment to the federal constitution is now applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 9 under Burdea1.4 there is no
constitutional violation unless a governmental agency is involved
in the illegal search and seizure.
Within accepted definitions of "state action," 10 there would
seem to be no official involvement in the principal case sufficient to
render the evidence constitutionally inadmissible under Mapp.
The conduct of the detective would not become state action until
he asserted official authority, which was not done in the principal
case. 11 Similarly, use of the illegally seized evidence by the prosecutor would not constitute a ratification under ordinary agency principles unless the detective had purported to act for the state during
the illegal seizure. 12 Furthermore, mere receipt of evidence by the
trial court would seem to fall outside the scope of the state-action
Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P .2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957): Gilliam v. Common•
wealth, 263 Ky. 342, 92 S.W.2d 346 (1936).
.
8. Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958). Michigan is apparently
the only state in which such evidence would be excluded in a civil action. See text ac•
companying note 33 infra. See also People v. Corder, 244 Mich, 274, 221 N.W. 309
(1928), holding that testimony by a private physician as to an examination made
without the defendant's consent is inadmissible as being in violation of Michigan
constitutional provisions against self-incrimination.
9. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), where the court interpreted Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), as having applied the fourth amendment to the states
through the due process clause. For a discussion as to whether Wolf actually did
extend the fourth amendment in toto to the states, see Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten
Years Later-Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN, L. REV, 1083,
1101-08 (1959). See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963), holding that the
fourth amendment's standard of the reasonableness of a search is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
10. See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM, L. REY, 1083
(1960).
11. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951). Although the court
in the principal case mentioned that a private detective is issued a metal badge by
the state, principal case at 14, there is no evidence -that the badge was used by the
detective to gain admission, to obtain the key, or for any other purpose. According to
the court, the detective has a "special status" derived in part from the fact that he is
licensed under Michigan law. Principal case at 15. See M1cH, CoMP. LAws § 338.801
(1948). Some members of the United States Supreme Court, particularly Mr, Justice
Douglas, have urged extension of the state-action doctrine to state-licensed facilities,
See, e.g., Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 282 (1963) (concurring opinion); Gamer
v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 184 (1961) (concurring opinion). This argument has not yet
been accepted by the full Court, however, and has been advocated only in the context
of the equal protection clause. See note 14 infra.
12. Rl?sTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 85(1) (1948).
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concept announced in Shelley v. Kraemer, 13 which forbids judicial
enforcement of private arrangements that would violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment if entered into by
the state.14 Thus, in excluding illegally seized evidence from a
criminal trial without insistence on finding state action, the principal
case represents a significant departure from the line of cases stemming from Burdeau v. McDowezz.w
Recognizing that the lack of any official involvement in the illegal
taking precluded exclusion of the evidence on federal constitutional
grounds, the court turned to policy arguments to effect a similar result on non-constitutional grounds.16 The objections of the court to
the admission of illegally seized evidence have often been raised before.17 The need to preserve the integrity of the law-enforcement
process has led the courts to impose rigorous standards of behavior
on the police and on themselves. Thus, the courts have recognized
that disrespect for law and order is engendered when police and
prosecutors are allowed to benefit from illegal acts. The state, it
has been felt, ought to be the model rather than the evader of legal
propriety.18 The principal case adopted this rationale vis-a-vis the
13. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
14. Shelley is primarily an equal-protection doctrine, as illustrated by the following
cases in which the question of its applicability arose: Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,
256 (1964) (concurring opinion); id. at 328 (dissenting opinion); Black v. Cutter Labs,
351 U.S. 292 (1956): Rice v. Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); In re Girard College
Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). There are
other indications that the concept of state judicial action would not be applied to the
principal case. First, there has been some reluctance to extend Shelley beyond its
particular facts. See, e.g., Black v. Cutter Labs, supra; Rice v. Memorial Park Ceme•
tery, supra; In re Girard College Trusteeship, supra. Second, judicial involvement in
admission of illegal evidence has been condemned on non-constitutional grounds as
recently as 1960. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See also Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion); Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (dissenting opinion). See generally Henkin, Shelley v. KraemerNotes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 473 (1962); Lewis, supra note 10, at
1108-20.
15. See cases cited note 7 supra. An even more radical departure from the Burdeau
principle was the lower-court opinion in Sackler v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224
N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1962), rev'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962), which
excluded evidence illegally obtained by the husband in a civil divorce action on the
ground that Mapp "points the way" to exclusion where private persons are involved
and that a New York law similar to the fourth amendment required exclusion of such
evidence. See 48 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 345 (1962); 46 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1119 (1962); 72 YALE
L.J. 1062 (1963). Compare Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958),
discussed at note 8 supra and accompanying text.
16. While the court spoke in broad language of a fundamental constitutional right
to privacy, it nowhere explicitly stated that the exclusion was based on such a right.
See principal case at 5, 8.
17. E.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); cases cited note 18 infra.
18. See, e.g., Blackbum v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 483 (1928)
(dissenting opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465,477 (1921) (dissenting opinion by Brandeis, J.).
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prosecutor and apparently extended it to private detectives, who in
its view enjoy a "special status" under Michigan law and are bound
to a higher standard of compliance with law than other citizens,19
Courts have also been unwilling to compromise their own integrity by becoming involved in attempts by the government to benefit
from illegal acts. In Elkins v. United States,20 the Supreme Court,
exercising its supervisory power over federal courts, excluded from
federal criminal prosecutions evidence illegally gathered by state
officials and given to federal officials. This rejection of the "silver
platter" doctrine was based partly on the ground that the "imperative of judicial integrity" demanded exclusion; 21 when courts permit
the perpetration of illegal schemes they themselves become "accomplices in willful disobedience to law." 22
Perhaps the most serious non-constitutional objection to permit- ting the use in evidence of the fruit of illegal private seizures is
the opportunity for collusion between the police or prosecutor and
private persons, especially detectives or informants. It seems clear
that if a prior agreement between officials and private persons were
proved, the evidence seized pursuant to the agreement would be
constitutionally inadmissible, because the state itself would have
conspired to violate the fourth amendment. 23 Thus, private illegal
seizures could merely be a mask for constitutionally prohibited
conduct, and otherwise inadmissible evidence might have to be admitted, under the Burdeau doctrine, unless collusion were actually
proved. The principal case recognizes the danger of police-private
party coalitions but fails to justify the exclusion of the evidence
absent proof of such a coalition.24
Some support for excluding evidence without proof of collusion
may be found in the difficulty for the defendant of proving an illicit
agreement and in the inadequacy of other remedies to deter private
illegal seizures. In many instances the defendant is not in a position
to learn of, much less prove, the existence of an agreement between
private persons and the police. Moreover, it seems doubtful that
the right to call the alleged participants to testify would protect
the defendant. The defendant may not even suspect the involvement of private persons; even if he does, he may not be able to
19. The "special status" is derived by the court from the fact that Michigan law
requires a detective to be licensed, approved by the sheriff and the prosecutor in the area
in which he intends to operate, and issued a metal badge by the state. See principal
case at 15; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 338.801, .802, .808 (1948).
20. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
21. Id. at 222.
22. Id. at 223, quoting McNabb v. United States, 31~ U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
23. As ,to the degree of cooperation necessary to constitute a conspiratorial agreement
and the problems posed by that issue in the silver-platter situation prior to Elliins, see
Kamisar, supra note 9, at 1171-77.
24. See principal case at 13, 15.
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identify the private participant. This could leave the defendant to
establish existence of the agreement solely by the testimony of a
public official who entered the agreement with the purpose of circumventing Mapp v. Ohio.
Despite the fact that private individuals do not enjoy the privileged status often afforded to police, civil remedies for illegal entry
and seizure are unlikely to prove more effective against private individuals than they were before Mapp against the police.25 The
speculative or nominal nature of damages for trespass and invasion
of privacy and the possible ignorance of aggrieved persons as to
their right to compensation militate against the effectiveness of
civil remedies as deterrents. Criminal sanctions, even where they
exist,26 tend to be ineffective, since the prosecutor would rarely,
if ever, prosecute his own staff and would be very reluctant to
jeopardize his relations with the police by prosecuting a policeman ·
or his private accomplice.27
On the other hand, the existence of a prior agreement would
seem to be less likely in connection with an illegal private seizure
than in the typical "silver-platter" situation involving large numbers
of individuals associated with two distinct, yet commonly cooperating
law enforcement systems.28 It would appear that at least in the
clearest cases of illegal seizures by one or two identified private
persons, the evidence could be admitted more freely without the
danger that hidden agreements might lurk in the background. In
such cases, a more moderate procedure might be preferable to
automatic exclusion due to the mere possibility of a secret collusive
agreement._For instance, where evidence admittedly seized illegally
by an identified private person is offered and the possibility of collusion exists, a burden of persuasion might be· placed upon the state
to establish the lack of collusion.29 The trial judge could then admit
or exclude the evidence in his discretion, considering such factors
as whether the private person is present for cross-examination,
whether that person maintains a close working relationship with
25. As to the ineffectiveness of civil remedies as deterrents against illegal conduct
by the police, see Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 65 (1957). The "obvious futility of relegating the fourth ame~dment
to the protection of other remedies," was recognized in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652.
26. See generally Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 41 VA. L. REv. 621 (1955), indicating that such sanctions are not common
and that where they do exist prosecutions are almost non-existent.
27. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
28. See generally Kamisar, supra note 9, at 1180-90.
29. Cf. Hogan &: Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule-Its Rise, Rationale and
Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1, 28-29 (1958), suggesting that problems of proof in establishing
coercion during prolonged pre-commitment detentions of the defendant might have
been overcome by creating a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness. But cf.
Kamisar, supra note 9, at 1192-93 n.382.
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the police,30 and whether the police at the time of the seizure were
especially interested in the kind of activities in which the accused
was allegedly engaged.
The principal case is illustrative of the conclusion that the theory
that there may be secret agreements will not support the exclusion
as a matter of law of all evidence illegally obtained by private
persons. The detective and his assistant both testified, and there
was no dispute as to whether anyone else was involved in the illegal
entry. The court was careful to point out that in its opinion there
was no collusion between the detective and the police.81 Moreover,
the case for exclusion to avoid possible secret agreements is not
nearly so clear in a criminal adultery prosecution as it would be
had there been an illegal private seizure in connection with an
abortion, narcotics, or gambling prosecution. Adultery prosecutions
are more likely to be the afterthought of an irate spouse than a prearranged plan of the police.
It seems clear that one effect of extending the exclusionary rule
to unlawful private seizures would be to limit the amount and type
of information that could be supplied to law enforcement agencies
by informants, the extent of the limitation varying with the rationale used to exclude. Although exclusion because of the possibility
of secret agreements is not constitutionally compelled, its purpose
is to prevent hidden constitutional violations stemming from clandestine delegations by the police of their authority and from conspiratorial acquisitions of evidence. Thus, under this theory there
would be no reason to exclude the ordinary inforIJ?.ant's "tip" based
on rumor or personal knowledge obtained by conduct which, even
if illegal, did not constitute an "unreasonable search and seizure."
On the other hand, where the judicial-integrity approach is the
rationale for exclusion, any information obtained by conduct deemed
"illegal" could be excluded. However, the government's right to
use informants is well established and has not been viewed as
corrupting the law-enforcement process.82 Nevertheless, it would
seem that a distinction could be dra·wn between a situation in which
the procurement of the evidence was merely incidental to the informant's illegal activity, such as incriminating statements heard
30. Such persons would include not only detectives and informers, but also indi•
viduals belonging to vigilante groups or extremist organizations, such as the Ku Klux
Klan, which may have the sympathy of police departments in particular areas. Sec
generally Black, Burdeau v. McDowell-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Abso•
lutism, 12 B.U.L. REv. 32 (1932).
31. Principal case at 15. A striking example of such collusion is People v. Rogers,
261 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1965), in which a telephone operator, after eavesdropping on the
defendant's incriminating telephone conversations, voluntarily informed the police
and thereafter cooperated with them in obtaining further evidence.
32. See generally HARNEY & CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 13-21 (1960);
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,
60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Comment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 840 (1965).
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during an illegal gambling session, and one in which the evidence
was obtained pursuant to a search and seizure the only purpose of
which was the acquisition of evidence. It would appear that although the evidence in the former situation should be admissible
to preserve the government's right to use informants, the latter
evidence should be excluded where the state recognizes a legal
right to be free from unauthorized intrusions.33
A second effect of the exclusion in criminal cases of evidence
illegally gathered by private persons is that an analogy could be
provided for excluding similar evidence in civil cases. Evidence
illegally gathered by private persons is now admitted in civil cases
everywhere except in Michigan,34 while evidence illegally gathered
by public officials is generally excluded from civil cases.35 If exclusion
in criminal cases were based on the possibility of collusion, no analogy for exclusion in civil cases would exist unless the state were involved in the suit. However, the need to "preserve the judicial process
from contamination,"36 which is the basis of the judicial-integrity
concept, would seem to be as real in civil actions as in criminal and
thus would demand exclusion in both. Since the integrity of the
court rather than that of the plaintiff is involved, the rule could
lead to the harsh result that the plaintiff would lose an otherwise
valid right to compensation merely by introducing illegally seized
evidence without knowing of its illegal seizure.37 On the other hand,
it has been argued that exclusion is the only effective deterrent
against persons willing to run the risk of a light penalty in order
to obtain valuable evidence for use in civil actions. 38
The result in the principal case seems consistent with Michigan
33. See generally Edwards, supra note 26; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383
(1960). In ,the few states that do not recognize a right to privacy, the evidence could
be admissible since the search and seizure was not technically illegal. Even here,
however, a broad reading of the judicial-integrity approach could require exclusion
where the conduct, although not illegal, was highly improper.
34. E.g., Calumet Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 160 F.2d 285 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Munson
v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 166 P .2d 268 (1946); Herrscher v. State Bar, 4 Cal. 2d 399,
49 P.2d 832 (1935) (disbarment proceeding); Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423,
229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962); Thanhauser v. Milprint, 9 App. Div. 2d 833, 192 N.Y.S.2d 911
(1959). But see Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
35. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700, 702 (1965);
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1959) (dissenting opinion) (dictum); Rogers v.
United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938) (action for recovery of customs duties). In
Plymouth Sedan, supra, the Supreme Court ruled that exclusion is required in forfeiture actions whenever there is an illegal search and seizure. Part of the reason
given, however, was that forfeitures are "quasi-criminal." See also De Reuill, Applicability of the Fourth Amendment in Civil Cases, 1963 DuKE L.J. 472.
36. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (dissenting opinion of
Brandeis, J.).
37. See, e.g., Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958), where
plaintiff was saved from that fate only because the court, after excluding the evidence,
found the verdict in her favor sufficiently supported by other evidence.
38. Note, 8 UTAH L. REv. 84, 87 (1962).
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law recognizing a right to be free from unauthorized interference
with privacy,3 9 and with the prior cases which have not demanded
state action as a prerequisite to the exclusion of objectionably
obtained evidence. 40 While it is clear that because of the absence of
official participation in the search and seizure the exclusion was not
compelled by Mapp, the general aim of the case-to deter direct or
indirect invasions of privacy-is consistent with the broad policy of
the exclusionary rule. The exclusion seems justified on the ground
that the integrity of law enforcement demands that its operations not
conflict with public policy. In resolving the issue posed by the competing considerations of law enforcement and the individual's right
to privacy, the principal case has accepted the basic proposition that
law enforcement and society in general are not benefited in the long
run when they permit a criminal conviction at the expense of humiliating intrusions by unauthorized persons upon the defendant's
privacy.

39. See generally Plant, The Right of Privacy in Michigan, Mich. State B. J., March
1954, p. 8.
40. Lebel v. Swindcki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958); People v. Corder,

